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HORTON V. BROWNE, ILLUSTRATING CONFUSION 
(LITERALLY) IN THE CIVIL CODE 
Brian Flanagan∗ 
I. BACKGOUND 
In Horton v. Browne,1 the plaintiffs, three siblings, sought 
declaratory judgment recognizing them as owners of mineral 
rights.  
Initially, plaintiffs’ mother had full ownership of a 40 acre tract 
in Red River Parish. In 1997, the mother executed a donation that 
divided the land into three separate tracts, and gave each sibling 
ownership of a particular tract. In the same donation, the mother 
stated each sibling was to receive an undivided one third interest in 
the minerals covering the entirety of the 40 acres.2  
In the following years, a series of transactions occurred. One 
sibling was no longer involved after she sold her interest to another 
sibling in 2002. In 2003, the remaining two siblings sold their 
interest (collectively, the entirety of the 40 acres) to a third party, 
reserving their mineral interests.3 In 2004, the third party conveyed 
her rights in the property (again, the surface of the 40 acres) to the 
defendant, Donald O. Browne. In 2005, the siblings and Donald 
Browne executed a mineral lease in favor of Pride Oil and Gas 
Properties, Inc.4 No wells were spud until 2010.5 
                                                                                                             
      ∗   J.D./D.C.L., 2013, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State 
University. Special thanks to Professor Trahan for research suggestions and to 
Professor Moréteau for support and editing. 
 1. Horton v. Browne, 47,253 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/29/12) 94 So. 3d 1034. 
 2. Id. at 1036. While the act of donation could have been more specific, it 
arguably created a mineral servitude over the entirety of the 40 acres, and each 
sibling received a one third interest in the mineral servitude. Id. Thus, each 
sibling owned the surface of his particular tract, and a one third undivided 
interest in the mineral servitude covering the entirety of the 40 acres. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
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A dispute arose as to who owned the mineral rights at the time 
the first well was spud in 2010. Defendant Donald Browne, the 
owner of the surface, argued that the siblings’ mineral servitude 
prescribed in 2007 for 10 years non-use, and therefore, he owned 
the mineral rights. The plaintiffs contended that the original 
donation by the mother failed to create a valid mineral servitude, or 
alternatively, confusion occurred between their fractional interest 
in the servitude and their rights in the surface.6 
II. DECISION OF THE COURT 
The trial court ruled that the mother’s donation in 1997 created 
a single servitude, which prescribed in 2007.7 The court of appeal 
affirmed the trial court’s ruling.8  
Article 66 of the Mineral Code provides, “[t]he owners of 
several contiguous tracts of land may establish a single mineral 
servitude in favor of one or more of them or of a third party.”9 
Plaintiffs argued that the article was inapplicable, as it refers to 
“owners” and, at the time of the donation, the mother was the only 
owner. The court of appeal, however, looked to the intent of the 
mother, and determined that she intended to create a single mineral 
servitude.10 Further, the court found that “by agreeing to the terms 
in the conveyance, each plaintiff intended to be subject to a 
mineral servitude in favor of the others.”11 The donations of the 
surface and mineral rights were separate and distinct donations, 
even though they were executed by means of the same 
instrument.12 
                                                                                                             
 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:66 (1974). 
 10. Horton v. Browne, 94 So. 3d at 1037. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id.  
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As to the confusion argument, the court ruled that confusion 
did not occur with regard to the mineral servitude.13 Article 27(2) 
of the Mineral Code states, “a mineral servitude is extinguished by 
confusion.”14 However, the Mineral Code does not have specific 
articles regarding confusion of mineral servitudes. Thus the court 
applied by analogy the Civil Code articles regarding predial 
servitudes.15 The court cited Civil Code article 765, which states 
that a predial servitude is extinguished by confusion “when the 
dominant estate and servient estates are acquired in their entirety 
by the same person.”16  
Applying this article by analogy, the court found that because 
the landowner did not acquire the entirety of the dominant estate, 
but rather only a fractional interest, the servitude was not 
extinguished by confusion.17 This was so because the rights were 
unequal between the two estates; as a landowner in full ownership, 
one would have an independent right for the exploration of 
minerals, but as a co-owner of a mineral servitude, consent by all 
of the co-owners was required for mineral operations on the 
property.18 Accordingly, defendant Donald Browne was declared 
                                                                                                             
 13. Id. 
 14. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:27(2) (2000). 
 15. A similar question was presented in Allied Chemical Corp. v. Dye, 441 
So. 2d 776 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1983). The question was, “when a person has full 
ownership of a contiguous tract and also a fractional mineral servitude in the 
same land, are not the full ownership and servitude merged together and the 
servitude extinguished by confusion?” The court in Allied Chemical Corp. 
analogized former Civil Code article 805, an article on predial servitudes, which 
required that the two estates be of equal quality for confusion to occur. The 
court then found that full ownership and servitudes were not of equal quality, 
and therefore confusion did not occur. Horton v. Browne, 94 So. 3d at 1038. 
(Title IV of Book II of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, which formerly 
contained art. 805 as cited by the court in Allied Chemical Corp. v. Dye, was 
revised, amended, and reenacted by Acts 1977, No. 514, effective January 1, 
1978.) 
 16. In this case, the dominant estate would be the mineral servitude, and the 
servient estate would be the surface servitude. Id. 
 17. The court also cited Luther L. McDougal III, Louisiana Mineral 
Servitudes, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1097, in support of the outcome. 
 18. Horton v. Browne, 94 So. 3d at 1038. 
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the owner of the mineral rights to the 40 acres, as the mineral 
servitude created in 1997 had prescribed for non-use in 2007. 
III. COMMENTARY 
The determination of when and to what extent confusion 
occurs is nuanced. On confusion with respect to predial servitudes, 
Professor Saul Litvinoff writes: 
Confusion may take place only in part, as when the owner 
of the dominant estate acquires only a part of the servient 
estate the whole of which is burdened by the servitude, in 
which case the servitude continues burdening the rest of the 
servient estate if in doing so it affords any benefit to the 
dominant estate. On the other hand, confusion does not take 
place at all when the owner of the servient estate acquires a 
part of the dominant estate, in which case the servitude 
continues to exist in favor of the remaining part of the 
dominant estate.19  
Horton illustrates this distinction by analogy to mineral 
servitudes. Although each sibling owned the entirety of a particular 
tract of land (the servient estate), the entirety of the mineral 
servitude (the dominant estate) was not acquired by the same 
person, as each sibling only had a fractional interest in the mineral 
servitude. Therefore, based on analogy, the requirements of Civil 
Code article 765 were not met, so confusion did not occur at all.20  
It is interesting to note that article 66 of the Mineral Code 
provides an exception to this rule in that it allows owners of 
several contiguous tracts of land to establish a single mineral 
servitude in favor of one of them.21 For example, if the three 
siblings decided to create a mineral servitude in favor of one of the 
                                                                                                             
 19. SAUL LITVINOFF, 5 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE, OBLIGATIONS 641-
42, (2d ed., West 2001) (footnotes omitted). See also ATHANASSIOS N. 
YIANNOPOULOS, 4 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE, PREDIAL SERVITUDES 453 
(West 1983). 
 20. Horton v. Browne, 94 So. 3d at 1038. 
 21. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:66 (2000). The rule of Civil Code article 765 




2013] HORTON V. BROWNE 255 
 
siblings, confusion would not extinguish the mineral servitude 
burdening his particular tract, despite the fact that the dominant 
estate and servient estate would be owned in their entirety by the 
same person.22 
In a situation like the one in Horton, a challenge arises when 
one of the landowners decides to sell but wants to reserve his 
interest in the mineral rights. In this case, reserving the mineral 
rights would only reserve the interest in the existing mineral 
servitude. Of course, the prescription of non-use will accrue ten 
years from the date it was created, not from the date of sale of the 
land.23 As a practical matter, the siblings could have partitioned the 
mineral servitude. A partition would divide the servitude and result 
in each sibling having full ownership of the land and mineral rights 
in his particular tract. This would allow a sibling to create a new 
mineral servitude from the date of sale of the land. Alternatively, 
the siblings could have executed an acknowledgment of the 
servitude, pursuant to Mineral Code article 54, which would have 
extended the date of prescription for non-use.24 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 22. See LA. REV.STAT. ANN. § 31:66 (2000) and LA. CIV. CODE art. 765. 
 23. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:28 (2000). 
 24. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:54 (2000). 
 
 
